On the evening of 28 July 1915, 330 US sailors and marines disembarked from the USS Washington at Bizoton, south of Port au Prince. They were reinforced by troops dispatched from the US mainland and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. By late August, 2000 marines occupied Haiti. A Haitian man who had watched the marines arrive later recounted to the historian Roger Gaillard how the marines confronted no resistance (the only two casualties in the initial invasion were two marines killed by friendly fire). ‘Everyone fled,’ Gaillard’s informant recalled. ‘Me too. You just had to see them, with their weapons, their swaggering and ostentatiously menacing attitude, to immediately understand both that they had come to hurt our country, and that resistance was impossible.’

The occupation was the culmination of shifting relations between the US and Haiti at the beginning of the twentieth century. By the early twentieth century, the US had replaced France as Haiti’s major trading partner, and purchased from France the majority shares of Haiti’s national bank, establishing almost complete control over Haitian finances. This article focuses on the latter half of the almost 20-year US occupation of Haiti. Following the brutal suppression of a peasant rebellion in 1919, US occupation officials turned to development projects such as education and public health to recuperate an occupation faltering under the weight of its own brutality. Drawing on original archival research in Haiti and the US, this article discusses the Service Technique d’Agriculture et de l’Enseignement Professionnel, the occupation’s technical and agricultural training program and the pinnacle of its revisionist strategy of rule.

Occupation officials devised the Service Technique in response to critiques of colonial violence, especially those that by 1920 had...
appeared in US newspapers. The occupation's public health and education efforts intended to recuperate the occupation, yet the Service Technique provided fertile terrain for anti-occupation protest to flourish. Program officials' racialized abuse of students and valorization of a neo-colonial agricultural order represented the Service Technique's continuation of European colonialism and racism. Student protest erupted around these issues in 1929, growing into a general strike so large it precipitated the marines' withdrawal from Haiti.

Investigation of this period fills a gap in the historiography of the occupation. As I discuss in greater detail in the following section, the existing literature mainly focuses on the occupation's first half, during which the marines replaced the original Haitian military with a new gendarmerie, politically and economically centralized the country around the capital of Port au Prince, and reintroduced a form of racial slavery under the corvee. The prevailing focus on the occupation's first half occludes the ways in which early twentieth century US empire used development as an instrument of military violence.

The archival material presented here provides a missing dimension to the Haitian historiography and lends perspective to broader debates over military developmentalism in geography and allied disciplines. The ways in which the Service Technique intended to recuperate a violent military occupation, yet produced a conflictual terrain that further fueled the anti-occupation movement, reveals the contentious and unintended effects of development as a military technology. In particular, the Service Technique speaks to scholarship from political, cultural, and historical geography that argues against an analytical bifurcation of war from peace. While this scholarship has focused on the continuation of militarism relative to its signification in shaping contemporary colonialism and racism, the existing literature mainly focuses on the occupation. As I discuss in greater detail in the following section, the Service Technique's tarnished image after the brutal repression of a peasant rebellion in 1919. The primary archival research presented here raises a gap in the historiography of the occupation, which early twentieth century US empire used development as an instrument of military violence.

1. Geographies of militarization: colonialism, development, and Haitian historiographies

In her review of approaches in Anglophone human geography to the study of militarism and military activities, Rachel Woodward observes a relative dearth of critical geographical scholarship on militarism relative to its significance in shaping contemporary times and spaces.4 Following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, geographers have produced a new body of scholarship concerned with US militarization. Within and outside of geography, this work has ranged from queries into the spatiality of military bases,5 the cultural politics and visual technologies of militarism,6 the intersections of militarism with science and academic knowledge,7 and geographies of war, violence, and peace more broadly.8 Geographers have played a key role in debates over the re-emergence of counterinsurgency,9 as well as the ‘security-development nexus’.10

Within this broad swath of scholarship on militarization, cultural, political, and historical geographers such as Scott Kirsch have explored the intersections of geography with cultural knowledge and colonialism. Kirsch’s work on the role of geographical science in the re-mapping and spatial imagination of the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century has shown how cartographic and ethnographic practices of occupation were linked to ‘processes of governmental knowledge production’.11 Kirsch and Flint’s Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-war Geographies raises a series of questions about the bifurcation of war from peace in geographical scholarship.12 In their focus on reconstruction, Kirsch and Flint’s work highlights the processes of conflict and militarized power that continue in periods of reconstruction, which are often firmly demarcated from war as ‘post-conflict’ periods of peace. Yet this field of inquiry leaves its obverse unexamined — what of the role of reconstructive development within the process of war-making? This article’s examination of development efforts via education in US-occupied Haiti extends Kirsch and Flint’s thesis that reconstruction is a process of conflict and militarized power to include development as a weapon of military occupation, and one that also refuses a sharp demarcation of war from peace.

4 R. Woodward, From military geography to militarism’s geographies: disciplinary engagements with the geographies of militarism and military activities, Progress in Human Geography 29 (2005) 719.


A second contribution this study makes is to the existing historiography of the first US occupation of Haiti, which focuses on the period leading up to a large peasant rebellion that by 1919 had swept the country and was the primary concern of the marines. The processes, characters, and events leading up to the Cacos Rebellion in 1919 dominate much of the historiography of the occupation. The cacos, whose name was likely inspired by the taco, a small, fierce bird native to the island, were peasant guerillas operating in a long tradition dating back to ‘harassing the French’ during the Revolutions. In the nineteenth century the phrase cacos came to identify a group of small-holding peasants who took up arms to challenge the Salnave government in 1867. Through the rest of the nineteenth century, the cacos were called upon by rural chiefs to undertake revolutionary activity against the national government in Port au Prince. Indeed, the cacos were central in staging revolts that deposed one president after the next in the years leading up to the US occupation. As soon as the marines filled the role of Haiti’s central power, the cacos redirected armed rebellion against the US occupation.

For nearly two years, former Haitian Army commander Charlemagne Peralte led the cacos in armed revolt against the marines and the Haitian gendarmerie the marines had created. Peralte’s forces drew the marines and gendarmes into open combat, provoking them to deploy air-ground assaults in some of the marines’ first uses of aerial bombardment. Haitian historian and journalist Roger Gaillard collected oral testimonies from elderly Haitians who had lived under the occupation and recalled this period of armed rebellion. Gaillard’s work is so significant not only because his multi-volume chronicle provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of the US occupation, but also in light of Haitian historian Suzy Castor’s critique of available literature as missing Haitian perspectives on the occupation. While US historians such as Hans Schmidt have provided a valuable chronology of the occupation, their heavy reliance on US documents has the effect of silencing Haitian experiences of the occupation.

Gaillard’s testimonies from elderly Haitians recall what it was like to live under and resist US occupation. Yet even in this most expansive text on the occupation, Gaillard largely follows the arc of caco resistance, centering around the heroic figure of the caco leader Charlemagne Peralte. Peralte looms large in scholarly and popular memories of the occupation in part because of his murder by the marines. The marines circulated a photograph of Peralte’s slain body, intending to demoralize caco fighters. However, the marines made the mistake of tying Peralte to a door propped against a wall such that he resembled Jesus on the cross. Historian Hans Schmidt writes that ‘the photograph became a continuing source of inspiration to Haitian nationalists’. The Garde’s murder of Peralte came to represent its cultivation of a tradition of violent suppression of its own countrymen. The destruction of the old Haitian military and the marines’ re-creation of the Garde in this light is another key theme in the historiography of the occupation. Michel-Rolph Trouillot emphasizes in his seminal text, Haiti: State Against Nation, the fundamental difference between the Garde and Haiti’s first army: ‘For all its flaws — and despite the fact that it had killed as many Haitians during the second half of its 122-year-long history as it had Frenchmen during the war for independence—Haiti’s first army saw itself as the offspring of the struggle against slavery and colonialism’. Peralte’s murder was emblematic of the new Garde: the new army was created to fight against its own countrymen, and it attracted a particular type of person — one with ‘a taste for violent solutions’.

The Garde also left Haiti with a more centralized military structure. Throughout the nineteenth century, one effect of the decentralized political structure was that Haitian army officers, although they possessed tremendous power, also had to cultivate support among local residents of the towns they commanded. Haitian geographer and politician Georges Anglade emphasizes how the lack of a powerful central government in the nineteenth century actually meant that villagers could get rid of commanders who abused their power. This all changed with the introduction of a powerful, centralized military structure during the US occupation. The marines’ implementation of a new military structure allowed political strongmen to more easily control the country from Port au Prince, an important factor in Duvalier’s rise several decades later. Political and economic centralization accompanied this military centralization. Increased economic dependence on coffee and changes in customs duties eroded what was before a regionalized economy and now became centralized around Port au Prince.

Given the important changes that took place during these initial years of occupation, the available literature’s focus on the years leading up to the 1919 rebellion provides valuable information. At the same time, the literature’s focus on armed rebellion gives little sense of how occupation operated beyond the barrel of a gun. Even for Gaillard, the latter half of the occupation features only as an epilogue to the last volume in his series. Castor has argued that following the demise of armed rebellion, Haitian resistance became more urban, bourgeois, and organized around a series of nationalist journals such as La Nouvelle Ronde, La Revue Indigène, and Le Petit Impartial. Castor refers to this period as ‘rebolution of the pen’ forged by ‘literary Cacos’ (‘rebolution de la plume’ and ‘Cacos de saloon’). The limitations of an independence movement based primarily on the printed word in a country whose citizenry was and remains largely illiterate is one possible explanation for the lack of attention to this period in the literature. Yet at the same time, the period following the reorganization of the occupation in the early 1920s presents an interesting opportunity to understand how US occupation shifted from a strategy of rule based on military force to one that made claims to be ‘taking up the white man’s burden,’ and operating more through development than conventional military force.

Mary Renda’s work on paternalism is an especially important exception to a historiography that pays little attention to the cultural dimensions of US empire in Haiti. In Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, Renda attends to paternalism’s ‘cultural conscription’ of marines into the project of US rule in Haiti. Renda’s work is a major contribution to both cultural studies of US imperialism as well as Haitian historiography. Through examination of marines’ diaries, correspondence, official government records, and cultural artifacts such as plays and literature, Renda analyzes paternalism in the context of marines’ understandings of themselves as well as its diffusion through the role...
Haiti came to play in US culture in the years following the occupation. Renda’s discussion of paternalism in relation to the violence of the Cacos Rebellion is an especially important contribution. Here she argues that paternalism did not mitigate against violence but rather ‘reinforced and extended it.’ As the following sections discuss, development projects (mainly education and public health) also perpetuated US military violence.

Adding a focus on development to Renda’s existing discussion of paternalism changes prevailing understandings of the post-armed rebellion period. In her periodization of the occupation, Renda refers to the years following the Senate investigation and reorganization of the occupation as ‘a period of relative tranquility,’ which followed the 1922 reorganization and lasted until a renewed phase of protest in 1929. Hans Schmidt also refers to this period as ‘a time of peace, political stability, and relative economic prosperity in Haiti.’

Renda and other scholars point to the student protest at the Service Technique in 1929 as the turning of the tide of what was otherwise a Pax Americana phase of the occupation. What this treatment of the period following the reorganization of the occupation in 1922, but before the strike of 1929, misses, is how occupation officials’ turn to development provided a new, contentious terrain that Haitians could transform into material for renewed protest.

Developmentalist claims are就好像 borrowed specifically to the strike, such as Rulhière Savaille, treat the strike at its inception as merely a student affair. Savaille argues that the strike was not inspired ‘by any political mobilization, it was not anti-American, nor was it anti-government, only a reaction to the reduction of a number of scholarships and of an insult on the part of Freeman were at its base.’ Brenda Plummer too describes the strike as the rebellion of elite students who eventually won the sympathy of other students and workers. I argue here for a re-framing of this period and event as much more significant to understanding the changes in the occupation’s strategy following the reorganization in 1922. I treat the strike as a window into larger struggles over race, class, education, and government in occupied Haiti. Examination of how protest developed within the very institution that was intended to quell criticism of the occupation provides a very different understanding of the years leading up to massive protests and strikes in 1929.

An understanding of this period that attends to the ways in which militarized development provided fertile terrain for anti-occupation protest also contributes to literature from critical development studies focusing on development’s relation to colonial counter-insurgency. Historian of Africa Frederick Cooper, for example, has studied the ways in which French and British colonial governments in the 1940s attempted to use development to reinvigorate colonialism following strikes and ‘disturbances’ in African and Caribbean colonies in the 1930s and 40s. Colonial powers turned to services for urban workers (water, health, housing, and education) as a mechanism to quell colonial unrest. Such projects were intended as a mechanism of control to suppress anticolonial rebellion, yet they also contained universalistic language that became the basis for trade unionists’ claims in the colonies. Trade union and political leaders could engage with the colonizers’ developmentalist claims and use them to pose demands that were intelligible to London and Paris.

In his influential study of development in Lesotho, The Anti-Politics Machine, James Ferguson examines how development institutions generate their own form of discourse about an object of intervention, creating a structure of knowledge around that object. Development projects fail to achieve the stated aims of planners, who organize interventions on the basis of this structure of knowledge. Yet in ‘failing,’ development expands the field of bureaucratic state power in people’s everyday lives, acting as an ‘anti-politics machine’ in the sense that it projects ‘a representation of economic and social life which denies “politics” and, to the extent that it is successful, suspends its effects.’

While Ferguson finds this expansion of state power to exert a ‘powerful depoliticizing effect,’ development projects in US-occupied Haiti were politicizing. Here the specificity of development as colonial counter-insurgency is of particular interest. He distinguishes from the study of development’s unintended consequences more broadly, particularly via understandings of development as discourse. The notion of people turning development to uses unanticipated by planners is widely acknowledged. However, Cooper’s argument is distinctively closer to a Gramscian understanding of hegemony as discussed by William Roseberry in his essay, ‘Hegemony and the Language of Contention,’ where he proposes that we use the concept of hegemony to understand struggle rather than consent. A similar sense of what Roseberry describes as ‘contention, struggle, and argument,’ also captured in Cooper’s analysis, is echoed in the Service Technique’s transformation of students into protestors. When the story of the Service Technique is viewed through the lens of critical development studies scholars such as Cooper, who understands development as born out of colonial counter-insurgency, what is a neglected period in Haitian historiography becomes a crucial turning point at which development fueled an anti-occupation protest.

While my analysis of the Service Technique takes from Cooper’s acknowledgment of development’s birth out of colonial counter-insurgency, it also changes Cooper’s geography and periodization. The following sections point to the 1920s, to Haiti, and to US imperial power as significant forces in shaping the historical geography of militarized development. While Cooper shows European colonies in the 1940s to be militarized development’s birthplace, my research points to the earlier emergence of militarized development in the 1920s, in a different site of US-occupied Haiti. This alternative historical geography and periodization distinguishes US

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22 Renda, Taking Haiti, 35.
24 Most scholars of the occupation treat the 1929 strike as a turning point, including Renda, Schmidt, Plummer, Castor, and Gaillard. Laurent Dubois (Haiti, 283) also treats the strike as a turning point, but uniquely identifies conditions at the school as representing the larger grievances of Haitians under occupation.
25 R. Savaille, La Grève de 29 (le première grève des étudiants haïtiens) 31 octobre 1929, Port au Prince, 1979, 22.
28 Cooper, Modernizing bureaucrats, 44.
34 Roseberry, Hegemony and the language of contention, 360.
from European imperialism, which also raises the broader question of what other differences distinguish militarized development in a context of US empire from its European counterparts.

2. Occupation’s ‘horrible acts’

Gaillard’s testimonies speak to the brutality of the initial period of the marine occupation. In just one example from Gaillard’s numerous testimonies, multiple residents recalled ‘Ouiliyanm,’ the Creole spelling and pronunciation of ‘William,’ a marine commander of two sub-districts in the Central Plateau who, Gaillard writes, ‘maintained in the inhabitants of whom he was in charge a state of constant terror.’ Ouiliyanm entered the living room of a Haitian general on his horse, had it shit on the floor, and ordered the general’s daughter to clean it up. He roamed about town until he found a man napping on his balcony, whom he beat until the man’s head was bloody, screaming ‘you sleep now because you were with the cacos at night.’ Another of Gaillard’s informants recalled Ouiliyanm asking his sister in law where the cacos were hiding, and in response that she did not know, he shot her dead on the spot.

Tales of what one Haitian commentator would call the marines’ ‘horrible acts’ began to trickle into the US press following Pétare’s murder and the crushing of the Cacos Rebellion in 1919. The marines’ atrocities in Haiti became a major issue in the 1920 US presidential election. In an effort to attract more African-American votes, the GOP sponsored NAACP field secretary James Weldon Johnson’s 1920 investigation in Haiti. Johnson wrote a series of articles for The Nation, in which he likened the occupation to slavery and discredited justifications of its ‘achievements’ in road-building by exposing the brutal corvée system through which roads were built. Johnson described sitting in tables of hotels and cafes in the company of marines, who spoke ‘without restraint’ of what they ‘did’ to Haitians. He writes: ‘I learned from the lips of American Marines themselves of a number of cases of rape of Haitian women by marines … I remember the description of a “caco” hunt by one of them; he told me how they finally came upon a crowd of natives engaged in the popular pastime of cock-fighting and how they “let them have it” with machine guns and rifle fire.’

Herbert Seligmann also wrote a series of exposes on Haiti for The Nation during the same period. ‘To Belgium’s Congo, to Germany’s Belgium, to England’s India and Egypt, the United States has added a perfect miniature in Haiti,’ Seligmann wrote in 1920. These very same slogans ran on placards greeting the Senate Commission that arrived in Port au Prince the morning of Tuesday, 29 November 1921 to inquire into the occupation and administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The testimonies from the commission repeat stories of random imprisonment, torture, indiscriminate killing, and racism. In just one of many examples, Polidor St. Pierre, a court clerk in the north of Haiti, told the commission how he was randomly arrested and thrown in prison, where his feet were shackled and he was hanged from the rafter of the prison by a rope attached to the chains of the handcuffs. ‘I passed five days hung thus without eating or drinking,’ he told the commission before showing the marks left on his wrists by the handcuffs. St. Pierre describes in detail how a marine captain tortured him by pouring boiling water down his throat, breaking his teeth, and burning his body with an iron.

Ultimately, the commission recommended that the occupation continue, but that it be restructured. The occupation consolidated power in the hands of a High Commissioner, and the anti-occupation movement took up the written word as its primary weapon. This new phase of occupation saw the introduction of public health and education programs under the Service Technique and the Service d’Hygiène. This turn toward public health and education demonstrates the emergence of development as a technology of rule in the face of harsh international criticism of violence, racism, and torture. Militarized development emerged in reaction to the ways in which military violence threatened to undermine the project of occupation.

The lack of scholarship on the period between the defeat of the cacos by the early 1920s and the departure of the marines in 1934 means that little is known about the shifts in the occupation’s strategy during these years. Without attention to the occupation’s latter half in the historiography, and without studies of what went on within specific institutions such as the Service Technique, little is known about how a more hegemonic strategy of rule operated.

3. From ‘indiscriminate killing’ to ‘carrying the white man’s burden’

On 23 February 1926, Smedley Butler addressed a telegram to General Russell in response to a newspaper article Russell had sent him. Butler wrote that he read the article ‘with such pleasure,’ and that the author ‘seems to have gotten the proper slant on things here.’ The article to which Butler was responding was titled ‘Firm Arms of US Marines Drag Hayti Out of Mire and Misrule’ and describes how Haiti ‘gains in health and prosperity’ under the ‘firm arms of US marines.’ The journalist wrote: ‘Carrying the white man’s burden in Hayti, although doing a great work for mankind no doubt in lifting a people slowly from virtual savagery to an orderly civilization, is really one of the most delicate diplomatic problems which confront the United States.’ The article goes on to describe how General Russell has brought ‘a measure of prosperity to the island which it never approached in its hundred years of freedom. During that long period, after the French were massacred, the island sank back into savagery.’ This commentary demonstrates the glorification of French colonialism and positioning of the marines as the new colonizers. The article also indicates how colonial administrators emphasized the humanitarian motives of development projects such as the Service Technique’s education efforts and Service d’Hygiène’s public health programs following the 1921 Congressional Hearings’ exposure of the occupation’s brutality.

The Service Technique and Service d’Hygiène appear often in
correspondence files of visitors to the island in the 1920s. These were sites shown to visitors to demonstrate the reformed goals of the occupation. Following her visit to Haiti, Doctor Rosalie Slaughter Morton wrote to President Hoover to congratulate him on accomplishments in the areas of Haiti’s public health, engineering, and education. Dr. Morton visited the Service Technique and Service d’Hygiène during her ‘goodwill’ mission to Haiti, leading her to write that the achievements were ‘really dramatic, because it means that timid backward people have a chance to reach education, understanding, and health.’ Other letters to occupation officials from the period reference the ‘humanitarian’ motives of the occupation exemplified in the Service d’Hygiène and the Service Technique.

Haitian commentators at the time were less convinced of the occupation’s humanitarian (mis)representation of itself. Danté Bellegarde, a Haitian intellectual who founded several literary reviews in the early twentieth century and later held diplomatic posts in Paris, the United States, and for the United Nations, challenged the idea of a humanitarian occupation. Bellegarde turned claims of ‘humanity’ on their head by pointing both to the physical violence the marines inflicted on Haiti and the ‘horrible acts’ committed within the geographical boundaries of hypocritical foreign powers. He writes: ‘And the lesson of humanity that they have brought to us has been so brilliant that in the first four years of the occupation alone they have massacred, at times with horrible tortures, 3500 Haitians, a figure which probably exceeds the number of victims of all Haitian revolutions put together.’ In Bellegarde’s writings, ‘humanity’ cloaks the truly nefarious forces of occupation. He codes ‘humanity’ as violent, imperial, and an impingement on Haitian sovereignty.

Yet at the same time as Bellegarde wrote of ‘humanity’s’ violent underpinning, occupation officials told themselves a story of carrying the ‘white man’s burden.’ One official wrote in a report that the necessity for supporting the new government was obvious, as a withdrawal of the United States Forces would have resulted in its immediate overthrow. Furthermore, it appeared essential from a humanitarian point of view to assist the Haitian people in freeing themselves from the hopeless condition which continued revolutions and a policy of despotic militaries had produced. Occupatio

The Service Technique embodied the paternalistic attitude of occupation officials that Haitians were incapable of self-government and had to be reformed in order for power to be transferred. Education became a major focal point through which this reform was to take place. A report describes the vocational and agricultural education program as intended to ‘teach Haitians the dignity of labor and show them how to promote the agricultural development of their country.’ Such statements conceive of education as re-forming Haitians into subjects capable of self-government.

The Service Technique was signed into law as a technical and training branch of the Haitian Department of Agriculture in 1922. George Freeman, a US agricultural engineer previously working for the French government on a cotton cultivation project in Indochina, was appointed as its director in 1923 alongside 30 other US Americans and an Assistant to the Agricultural Engineer. A journalist recounted in an interview with Freeman that he ‘issued the opinion that the first and the biggest need of the indigenous population is to be better-dressed, better-educated, and better-instructed in order to serve the country with intelligence and efficiency.’ In providing students with agricultural and vocational education, Freeman also understood himself as bestowing upon them behavioral characteristics.

The first school term was held in the fall of 1924, at which time approximately 50 students were enrolled in courses like animal pathology, botany, chemistry, sugar production, and carpentry. By 1926, the Service Technique was sponsoring district and regional fairs and agricultural expositions in Port au Prince. The Service Technique housed multiple institutions, including foremost the central school at Damien (see Fig. 1), which was intended to train government technicians and the next generation of rural farm school teachers. The Damien campus, about 8 km northeast of downtown Port au Prince, was described by US observers as occupying a ‘beautiful new building, well supplied with classrooms, laboratories, and other necessary equipment and has shops and ample grounds for gardens and experimental farms.’

The central school was supported by an architecture of rural farm schools throughout the country, demonstration farms, coffee and livestock experiment stations, a dairy, demonstration coffee mills, veterinary clinics, and farm advisors. Visitors described how the farm schools

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45 R. Morton, August 24, 1929, Letter to President Hoover, NARA Record Group 59, file no. 838.00/2568.
46 D. Bellegarde, L’Occupation Américaine d’Haiti: Ses Conséquences Morales et Économiques, Port au Prince, 1929; D. Bellegarde, Pour Une Haiti Heureuse, Port au Prince, 1929.
47 D. Bellegarde, February 20, 1930, Letter to Secretary of State from Stuart Grummon (Assistant Secretary of State), NARA Record Group 59, file no. 838.00/2584.
48 J. Russell, 1929, Outstanding Achievements Resulting from Our Treaty with Haiti, 1915–1929 (Pamphlet, Department of State), NARA Record Group 59, file no. 838.00/2525.
49 Memorandum on the American Intervention in Haiti, 1929, NARA Record Group 59, file no. 838.00/2528.
50 R. Buell, December 13, 1929, The American Occupation of Haiti (Foreign Policy Association Information Service, 1926), NARA Record Group 59, file no. 838.00/2618 1/2; Haiti, the Black Republic, The Times, December 13, 1929; NARA Record Group 59, file no. 838.00/2674.
51 G. Freeman, May 9, 1923, Receipt of Telegram from Dr. Freeman to General Russell, NARA Record Group 84, v.219, file no. 861.
52 Interview Du Docteur Freeman, April 18, 1923, Le Temps, Bibliothèque de Saint Louis de Gonzague, Port au Prince, Haiti [hereafter SLG].
54 Correspondence File, 1926, NARA Record Group 84, v.178, file no. 842.
occupy modern and substantial houses, and the grounds are properly fenced and made attractive.\textsuperscript{56} Experiment stations grew crops such as corn, cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, manioc, potatoes, haricots, and sisal.\textsuperscript{57}

Together, this architecture was intended to re-make a Haitian peasantry whom occupation officials understood as ignorant of modern agricultural techniques. Occupation officials referred to the "condition of the peasants" as "one of absolute poverty, utterly primitive farming and living conditions, ignorance, and disease."\textsuperscript{58} Administrators considered the Service Technique to be the antidote to this "condition," which was also symptomatic of Haitians' lack of readiness for self-government. A 1923 plan for the organization of the Service Technique wrote of the rural farm schools as designed to "increase the productive power of the rural populations" at the same time as "to make them healthier" through knowledge of sanitation and physiology. These efforts intended to "inspire the people with a greater appreciation of their own possibilities of development and to result in the uplifting of conscious citizenship and in the intensifying of the resources of nations production."\textsuperscript{59}

The school was a microcosm of the aspect of occupation that sought to "develop" and "uplift" Haitians. There is a strong connection here between undertaking productive activity on the land and cultivating a more hygienic and politically apt body politic. In learning modern agricultural techniques, the Service Technique was also "uplifting" a "conscious citizenship."

Officials wrote of the impossibility for self-government until the Service d'Hygiène and its medical corps have rebuilt their bodies and the Bureau Technique has developed their intellect.\textsuperscript{60} Vocational and agricultural education was seen as the cornerstone to the occupation's mission of advancing what officials described as the "backward" state of education. Such attitudes are visible in the correspondence files of US diplomatic officials at the time. One US Vice Consul wrote that "only ten percent [of Haiti's total population] have any education worthy of consideration. The illiterate class, as a whole, has little ambition and is content with little more than the necessities of life. From an educational standpoint, then, Haiti must be regarded as backward.\textsuperscript{61} The notion of a class 'content with little more than the necessities of life' is another way of describing Haitians' refusal to enter into the sort of wage labor the US occupation promoted.

An occupation official wrote of education as 'fundamental to any further important general advancement of the country.' The official envisioned such education transforming the peasant into an eager wage-laborer: 'once shown the way the tropical peasant would immediately desert his ignorant and easy mode of life for intensive, toilsome cultivation.\textsuperscript{62} The Service Technique provided agricultural and technical education toward the aim of bolstering agriculture for export that would employ wage laborers. Descriptions of existing modes of agriculture as 'unscientific,' and the tropical peasant as content with his 'easy mode of life,' were all part of the occupation's effort to encourage export agriculture.

Such efforts must be understood in the context of the great lengths Haitians had gone to after the war of independence from the French to establish an "anti-plantation" agricultural system comprised of independent smallholders cultivating foodstuffs for consumption and at times coffee for sale.\textsuperscript{63} When Haiti's independence heroes Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe attempted to re-institute plantation agriculture, the peasantry refused. Access to land was strongly associated with freedom from foreign occupation and racial slavery.\textsuperscript{64}

The version of agricultural education the Service Technique promoted was fundamentally at odds with the access to land and cultivation opportunities the peasantry had fought so hard to maintain since independence. Although the Service Technique was emblematic of the effort to recuperate occupation via development projects, in practice the project conflicted with meanings associated with agriculture derived from Haitian independence. It also articulated with racial dynamics of the occupation in ways that further destabilized the school.

Before the occupation, race operated in Haiti through the complex interplay of epidermal color, physical appearance, language, religion, and economic standing. The Kreyòl proverb 'Neg rich se milat, milat pov se neg' (the rich black is a milat, the poor milat is black) captures how one could 'become' milat if they were rich enough. Distinct from the English word 'mulatto' or the French 'mulâtre,' which refer to a person of mixed white and black ancestry, the Kreyòl word milat contains both reference to class and to color.\textsuperscript{65} The occupation changed this fluidity of racial categorization, replacing what was before a complex interplay of skin color with many other linguistic, cultural, and economic factors with an institutionalized preference for lighter-skinned officials. Trouillot writes that 'US racism added its institutional systematism to Haitian colorist favoritism.'\textsuperscript{66}

Yet the Service Technique represented a wrinkle in what was more generally the occupation's institutionalized favoritism of a light-skinned elite. School officials instead castigated the light-skinned elite, whom they wrote 'can not be cured of their old political vices.' A treaty official wrote in a report that 'turning the Government back to them is bound to be a failure that Haiti would very quickly revert to the chaotic conditions existing prior to 1915 should we withdraw. Our Treaty Officials have hence concentrated on the black peasants rather than the mulatto upper class.'\textsuperscript{67} The Service Technique thus represented a shift from occupation officials' preference of the light-skinned elite toward a focus on the black peasantry as the hope for a self-governed future.

Service Technique officials blamed Haiti's light-skinned bourgeoisie for 'overvaluing' classical and professional education. A report on the Service Technique reads: 'The fundamental difficulty in the development of agricultural and industrial enterprise in Haiti, is that tendency among her upper and middle classes to select the non-mechanical occupations or professions. If the economic and industrial development of the country is ever to be accomplished by the Haitians, themselves, it must be through the efforts of those of her intelligent classes who are willing to take hold of the tools of

\textsuperscript{56} Moton, 43.
\textsuperscript{57} Service Technique, 1930, Service Technique Du Département de l'Agriculture et de l'Enseignement Professionnel Rapport Annuel, 1929—1930, Imp. Service Technique, SLG.
\textsuperscript{58} United States High Commissioner to Haiti, 1929, Annual Report of the American High Commissioner at Port au Prince, Haiti to the Secretary of State, SLG.
\textsuperscript{59} Service Technique, 1923, Plan of Organization of the Technical Bureau of the Department of Agriculture and Professional Education, NARA Record Group 84, v.151, file no. 861.
\textsuperscript{60} C. Wood, February 1, 1929, Report on Political Situation in Haiti, NARA Record Group 84, v.219, file no. 800.
\textsuperscript{61} Correspondence File, 1928, NARA Record Group 84, v.125, file no. 861.
\textsuperscript{62} High Commissioner, 1929, Annual Report.
\textsuperscript{64} Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, 73.
\textsuperscript{66} Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, 129.
\textsuperscript{67} White, October 30, 1929, Letter to Secretary of State from Mr. White, NARA Record Group 59, file no. 838.00.
industry and by training and experience, learn the details of productive industry. In a conversation with a State Department official, George Freeman, director of the Service Technique, is cited as criticizing the disproportionate emphasis on ‘academic studies’ versus ‘vocational education’: ‘Entirely too much emphasis has been placed upon academic studies and not enough on vocational education along industrial and agricultural lines, with the result that Haiti is overrun with young men desiring to take up professions and occupations such as law, medicine, commerce, clerical and government positions, while the country needs instead trained agriculturalists and skilled workers to increase its productivity.’ Freeman then extrapolated that Haiti’s education system should be designed with the idea in view that ‘what Haiti needs above all else is an increase in the productive efficiency of her people … Haiti needs agricultural education for the rural masses and industrial education for the people of her towns and cities.’ The Service Technique then became, for occupation officials, the counterbalance to what they perceived as the elite’s overvaluation of professional and literary education. Such comments on the type of education Haiti supposedly needed must be understood in light of the US occupation’s drive for wage labor, especially agricultural wage labor that would support efforts to re-establish agricultural plantations for export.

As we see in the following section, racialization of the occupation at large and within the school came together to fuel the anti-occupation movement. Though the school’s mission might have valorized the black peasantry, school administrators mistreated their students. Anti-occupation organizers outside of the school and even US delegations sent to evaluate it criticized its racially-coded attacks on classical education. Meanings associated with education, race, and agriculture came together within the Service Technique to foment critique. Rather than resolving conflict as it was intended, the school introduced new dynamics of contention and contradiction.

4. The strike of 1929 and the end of occupation

On Thursday, 31 October 1929, George Freeman, director of the Service Technique, sat in an armchair in his office with his legs outstretched and a pipe in his hand, listening through an interpreter to a student delegation complains that they were discriminated against. Freeman’s character, referring to his gesture (ring shots into the crowd) as ‘not a civilized one,’ and calling for Freeman to resign. The Haitian press at the time publicized the students’ declaration, painting the strike not only as a protest against scholarship regulations, but against the school’s general wastefulness. The Haitian newspaper Le Temps described the strike as ‘against the extraordinary waste of money,’ and the Service Technique as ‘created not for them [the students], but for American experts.’ The article continued that ‘the army of experts will be more substantial than the army of the American occupation, more substantial still than the number of students trained.’ The journalist compared the relatively small amount of money allocated to scholarships to the massive expenditures on ‘expert’ salaries.

On 7 November, the Department of Agriculture issued a declaration threatening students with expulsion if they did not return to school. The next morning, strikers successfully recruited students from the law school to join the effort. Diplomatic correspondence described the students disparagingly and the events as lacking in political significance. One official report commented: ‘As a culmination of this strike, the students of the École Centrale yesterday succeeded in getting the students of the law school of Port au Prince to leave the school, augmented by a lot of on-lookers and raga-muffins, paraded through the streets and finally stopped in front of Dr. Freeman’s house where they threw rocks and fired one shot.’ The Haitian newspaper La Presse, reporting it was Freeman who fired shots from a revolver, explained the events as illustrative of Freeman’s character, referring to his gesture (firing shots into the crowd) as ‘not a civilized one,’ and calling for Freeman to resign.

The next morning, members of the medical, dental, and

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69 G. Freeman, September 10, 1926, Memorandum of Conversation between George Freeman and State Department Official, NARA Record Group 84, v.185, file no. 842.
70 G. Freeman, September 10, 1929, Memorandum of Conversation, NARA.
71 Savaille, La Grève, 11.
72 Report on the Agricultural and Vocational Education System of the Service Technique Du Departement de l'Agriculture et du Enseignement Professionnel, 1926, NARA Record Group 84, v.185, file no. 842; Correspondence File, November 8, 1929, NARA Record Group 84, v.218, file no. 800.
73 Correspondence File, November 8, 1929.
74 Correspondence File, November 8, 1929.
75 L’Incident de Damien, November 4, 1929, Le Temps, SLG.
76 Savaille, La Grève, 25.
77 ‘L’Incident de Damien.’
78 Savaille, La Grève, 25.
79 J. Russell, November 8, 1929, Letter from John Russell to the Secretary of State, NARA Record Group 84, v.218, file no. 800.
80 Autour de L’Incident de Damien, December 9, 1929, La Presse, NARA Record Group 84, v.218, file no. 800. It is unclear who fired shots or whether shots were indeed fired. La Presse later printed a retraction that the sounds were not shots fired, but rocks thrown by protestors. The interesting part of this coverage is how it was interpreted as a lack of civility on the part of Freeman.
and had to support themselves in Port au Prince. In an interview with a privileged bunch who did not want to get their hands dirty, the occupation broadly the monetary waste of US occupation of Haiti. While changes in scholarship structures were an in-

Fig. 2. This cartoon, from the Haitian newspaper La Presse (March 13, 1930) makes fun of the experts of occupation Freeman came to represent. The caption below the cartoon reads: ‘To be a good expert, you must, gentlemen, first, not know French, and, second, not have any specialty — that is to say “a Jack of all trades and Master of nothing.”’ (Saint Louis de Gonzague, Port au Prince).

pharmacy schools of Port au Prince also left their campuses in sympathy with the Damien strikers. The days that followed saw marches through downtown Port au Prince and the steady building of support throughout various facets of life around Port au Prince (see Fig. 4). By the time puppet president Borno issued an order on 18 November offering to forgive striking students willing to return to school, it was clear to all that the strike had become a national affair, carrying multiple meanings that threatened the occupation on the whole. That same day as the presidential order was issued, the striking students met at a park, gave several speeches, and burned an effigy of George Freeman. Freeman had come to represent the occupation’s experts in agriculture, public health, and education, who were highly-paid and often unfamiliar with Haitian history or the French language, let alone Kreyol. Such experts came to define the latter half of the occupation as it attempted to re-brand itself in a humanitarian light (see Fig. 2).

While occupation officials were quick to dismiss the strikers as a privileged bunch who did not want to get their hands dirty, the Haitian press at the time presented a more complicated story that many of the striking students did in fact come from the provinces and had to support themselves in Port au Prince. In an interview the Haitian newspaper La Presse conducted with Service Technique officials during the strike, a journalist asked why, instead of diminishing the existing scholarship allocations in order to support poorer students, the school did not reduce the number of highly-paid experts, to which the official had no reply. Haitian newspapers from this period frequently touched on the Service Technique’s rules. The school fined students one months’ pay for eating a papaya from the school’s farm, instructors referred to students as ‘pigs,’ and administrators disciplined students in a similar fashion to a military academy.

Despite President Borno’s threats to expel them, students refused to return to Damien, and the medical and law students continued their sympathy strike, their numbers continuing to grow as students from the Catholic schools now joined the effort. By the end of the month, the strike had become contagious: students in Jacmel and Gonaïves also walked out of their classrooms and merchants closed shop in solidarity with the Damien strikers. Three schools went on strike in the southern city of Aux Cayes, and in Jacmel, students in all schools in the city walked out, with customs house and bank employees joining the effort. Strikers paraded through the streets of Jacmel and burned an effigy of George Freeman.

As the strike spread, its meaning expanded, carrying with it the ghosts of past revolutionaryaries and struggles against foreign occupation. In 1922, Jacques Roumain, one of Haiti’s most celebrated novelists, founded, with a group of literary figures deeply formed by the occupation, the journal Le Petit Impartial. The journal served as the organ of the student opposition group, La Ligue de la Jeunesse Patriotique. Roumain was imprisoned in 1929 for his writings against the US occupation. While only in publication for 5 years, the pages of Le Petit Impartial speak to the cultural trauma of the US occupation. An open letter from the journal to occupation officials read: ‘Over the last 14 years, this unbearable regime has hunted down all the expressions of free thought and free expression of the injury of the nation, that, crushed and wounded, won’t stop carrying on its complaints and screaming its protest.’ The student protest was part of a larger constellation of Haitian intellectuals who defined the ‘cultural awakening’ of the 1920s, including transnational elite members of the opposition like Dantès Bellegarde, who denounced US imperialism on the floor of the League of Nations, and Joseph Jolibois, who carried the opposition’s message all over Latin America. Jean Price—Marx’s ‘So Spoke the Uncle’, a text that came to define a generation of Haitian intellectuals in its argument for cultural reclamation, was published in 1928, just

82 John Russell, November 25, 1929, Letter from John Russell to the Secretary of State, NARA Record Group 84, v.218, file no. 861.
83 Les Etudiants Du Service Technique et Monsieur Freeman, November 4, 1929, La Presse, SLG.
84 Les Etudiants, 1929.
85 V. Cauvin, June 2, 1932, Letter to Members of Congress of the United States from Victor Cauvin, Secretary General of L’Union Patriotique, Le Peuple, SLG.
86 Memo: Students’ Attitude Towards Arrete, November 1929, NARA Record Group 84, v.219, file no. 861.
87 Correspondence File, November 29, 1929, NARA Record Group 84, v.218, file no. 861.
88 Autour de L’incident de Damien, November 6, 1929, La Presse, SLG.
89 The student protest was part of a larger constellation of Haitian intellectuals who defined the ‘cultural awakening’ of the 1920s, including transnational elite members of the opposition like Dantès Bellegarde, who denounced US imperialism on the floor of the League of Nations, and Joseph Jolibois, who carried the opposition’s message all over Latin America. Jean Price—Marx’s ‘So Spoke the Uncle’, a text that came to define a generation of Haitian intellectuals in its argument for cultural reclamation, was published in 1928, just
before the students exploded in protest. Students’ transformation into protestors was part of what Castor calls the ‘rebellion of the pen’ that defined the anti-occupation movement after the cacos’ defeat.91

Student voices echoed the deeper currents of Haiti’s cultural critics, who directed the memory of independence from France squarely against the US. The slogans of Independence from the French paper the writings of Roumain and Jacques-Stephen Alexis. The front page of Le Petit Impartial from late 1927, on the eve of Haiti’s anniversary of independence from the French, quotes the Armée Indigène at Gonaives on 1 January 1804, ‘Liberté ou la Mort!’, and recalls the words of Toussaint Louverture: ‘In overthrowing me, you have done no more than cut down the trunk of the tree of black liberation; it will spring back from the roots, because they are numerous and deep.’ Haiti’s history of colonialism, slavery, and liberation served as a touchstone for anti-occupation figures in the 1920s. The Service Technique came to represent the US occupation’s continuation of a legacy of European colonialism and racism. When the strikers marched to the foot of the statue of Dessalines, they carried with them these ghosts of liberation from racial slavery and foreign intervention (see Figs. 3 and 4).

George Freeman, with his reputation for racism and financial waste, came to embody further this continuation of Haiti’s colonial legacy. The Haitian press referred to Freeman as a ‘little sovereign’ — ‘his majesty’ ruling over his sovereign kingdom. But journalists at the time also used the imagery of slavery in reference to Freeman. ‘He made a mistake,’ La Presse wrote of Freeman, ‘he reckoned, without hatred, with his unwarranted arrogance, that he would inspire the students. He thought he had made them into slaves; they were just resigned. Get out … get out … I am my own master, as I am Master of the Universe … of Haiti.’ The author listed the grievances Freeman imposed upon the students, then indicted Freeman: ‘he had certainly forgot, in that moment, that there is in the soul of the human a limit to all this suffering. Under the odious regime of slavery, one day, the slave, exasperated, stood up and said: that is enough. I want to die or live like a human.’92 Freeman had come to represent the new colonizers, and the Service Technique a vehicle for a new colonialism that reeked of old racial slavery.

Freeman’s neocolonial attitude was widespread in the correspondence of his fellow occupation officials. Valorizing the era of French plantation slavery, Freeman’s colleague wrote: ‘At the moment when Haiti conquered its independence from France, the French colonists had developed a highly successful system of tropical agriculture and irrigation. The country was in some sense a huge model farm. As soon as the untrained peasants came into occupation of the land, agriculture began to decay and revert to a primitive state. The peasant of to-day has neither in character, intellect, education, in farming ability, nor outlook greatly changed since 1804.’93 Here, US occupation officials glorified French colonialism and faulted the Haitian citizenry for its penury and political instability over the past 100 years. In particular, such judgments defined agriculture as the key resource the independent republic failed to manage. Agriculture is both, materially, a central aspect of colonial officials’ judgments, and, symbolically, representative of every other political and economic failure of the black republic. Students protesting the Service Technique brought the tools of Castor’s ‘rebellion of the pen’ to longer-standing struggles over dispossession from land under US promotion of plantation agriculture.

The strike at the Service Technique came to represent much more than a conflict over scholarships: the racism of US occupation officials had come to carry valences of their French colonial predecessors, and to symbolize the occupation’s privileging of light skin. The broader symbolism of the student’s strike encouraged the likes of customs house workers, bank employees, and residents of the provinces to join the students. On 6 December, the revolt of the provinces took center stage. By this time, the entire city of Aux Cayes was in revolt. A group of about 1500 strikers marched on the city. They were met by the Garde and demanded the release of several prisoners. The Garde fired upon the strikers as they advanced into town, killing a dozen people and injuring 23.94 The massacre at Aux Cayes sounded the death knell of the US occupation. The south of Haiti exploded at this time. In the small village of Chantel, outside of Aux Cayes, a crowd of 2000 people gathered, yelling ‘down with Borno, down with Freeman.’ In Torbeck, also near Aux Cayes, another 1000 people gathered, threatening to kill the corporal of the Garde, and shouted the same refrain.95

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91 Castor, L’Occupation Américaine, 191.
92 ‘L’Incident de Daman.’
93 Annual Report, 1929, NARA, 38.
94 Correspondence File, December 6, 1929, NARA Record Group 84, v.218, file no. 800.
95 Report, December 7, 1929, NARA Record Group 84, v.218, file no. 800.
In response to the spreading strike, the Garde was instructed to make itself more visible and march through the streets with machine guns prominently displayed.96 US occupation officials at the time stated that ‘Haitian mentality only recognizes force, and appeal to reason and logic is unthinkable.’97 Martial law had been declared on 4 December and a curfew enforced in Aux Cayes and Port au Prince. By the end of December, students at Damien and the medical school were still striking. The massacre at Aux Cayes continued to be a focal point for the burgeoning anti-occupation movement. In February, the Union Patriotique held a mass for those killed at Aux Cayes. The crowd shouted ‘Vive l’Indépendence’ and the police arrested several demonstrators.98 The strike was incredibly destabilizing to the US administration. General Russell requested additional marines to augment his existing force.

The strike would force the US to re-evaluate its presence in Haiti. President Hoover appointed Cameron Forbes to evaluate the occupation of Haiti on the whole, and Robert Russa Moton of the Tuskegee Institute to assess the education system specifically. The Haitian press referred to the Forbes Commission as the ‘commission blanc’ and the Moton Commission as the ‘commission noir.’99 The Moton Commission was instructed to only comment on the aspects of education controlled by the puppet Haitian government, protecting white US American administrators from criticism.100 While the Moton Commission was stranded because US Navy ships refused to transport black passengers (even federal agents), the Forbes Commission was allotted $50,000 to conduct its research and furnished with dignified lodging and transport.101 The unequal treatment of the ‘commission noir’ became demonstrative, to both Haitians and US Americans, of the occupation’s racism.

In its evaluation of education in Haiti, the Moton Commission was highly critical of the Service Technique, specifically the way in which it had siphoned resources away from the existing Haitian education system and separated agricultural from industrial training. In contrast to the disparaging tone with which white occupation officials spoke of the existing education system, the Moton Commission lauded the lycée and secondary school system that, Moton wrote, maintained a ‘high level of general culture’ and ‘deserve high praise’ given Haiti’s debt obligations.102 While the Haitian government contributed increasing sums toward education as they articulated with race, class, and imperial intervention, fueling the fires of anti-occupation sentiments. A closer look at this largely unexamined period of Haitian and US imperial history not only reveals Haiti’s centrality to the historical geography of US

The Moton Commission outlined multiple other shortcomings, from the Service Technique’s failure to improve agricultural production to damage done by industrial schools to local economies.103 Ultimately, the Commission recommended folding all rural education back under the Haitian Secretary of State for Public Instruction, and halting additional funds until existing programs were stabilized and scaled down. By the end of January 1930, the Secretary of State for Agriculture resigned, and Freeman left the country in April of that year. The Service Technique was reorganized in March, and was closed by July. The Forbes Commission recommended the withdrawal of US forces, yet the gradual pace of ‘Haitianization’ and the commission’s juvenileizing position that Haiti was not ready to govern itself disappointed many anti-US activists. Four years after the Forbes and Moton Commissions came to Haiti, on 15 August 1934, the last US marines departed. While the déseccuation had finally come to pass, the US directly supervised Haiti’s economy until 1942.105

5. Conclusion

This article takes its title from the Haitian proverb ‘bay kou bliye, pote mak sonje’—‘the one who strikes the blow forgets, the one who bears the scars remembers.’ The proverb reflects the ways in which the US occupation of Haiti constitutes, in Renda’s words, ‘little more than a footnote in standard accounts of U.S. history, while it is central to Haitian historiography and popular memory.’106 Yet one notable exception, in which the one who strikes the blow remembers, is in present-day US military trainings. In the context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military has again turned to development as a counterinsurgency weapon.107 This shift has also entailed a return to history, including the very history of US occupation in Haiti discussed here. Histories of militarized development such as the Service Technique directly inform the shape of contemporary US militarism: defense intellectuals consulted these histories as they wrote the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual108 and military instructors today reference US colonial and Cold War histories, including Haiti’s, as positive examples of ‘nation-building’ troops are again encouraged to undertake today.109

This article’s in-depth examination of the Service Technique cautions that militarized development cannot be dismissed as a cover-up for violent atrocities, nor can it be accepted as a more sophisticated form of ‘smart power.’110 The Service Technique provides a window into the ways in which the US occupation’s turn to development as a strategy of rule provided the materials to further unravel occupation. Contentious practices of education, especially as they articulated with race, class, and imperial intervention, fueled the fires of anti-occupation sentiments. A closer look at this largely unexamined period of Haitian and US imperial history not only reveals Haiti’s centrality to the historical geography of US

96 Correspondence File, December 2, 1929, NARA Record Group 84, v.218, file no. 800. 97 Correspondence File, December 2, 1929, NARA. 98 Correspondence File, February 12, 1930, NARA Record Group 84, v.218, file no. 800. 99 L’affaire de Damien: Une Victoire Remportées Sur Nous-Mêmes, July 30, 1930, Le Pays, SLG. 100 Plummer, Afro-American Response. 101 Plummer, Afro-American Response, 142. 102 Moton, 1931, 22. 103 Moton, 1931, 55–6. 104 Moton, 1931, 57–8. 105 Renda, Taking Haiti, 34. 106 Renda, Taking Haiti, 11. 107 J. Greenburg. ‘We’re an NGO with guns’: Haitian geographies of US militarized Development, PhD Dissertation, UC Berkeley, 2015. 108 Military intellectuals such as John Nagl, whose Oxford dissertation and eventual book compared British and French counterinsurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam, David Kilcullen, who conducted ethnographic dissertation research on counterinsurgency in Indonesia, and military historian and counterinsurgency expert H. R. McMaster directly advised General David Petraeus and participated in the writing of the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual references the 1940 Small Wars Manual, a document that grew directly out of US imperial expansion at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, including the US occupation of Haiti. 109 In military trainings I observed as part of my dissertation research (2010–2012), instructors specifically referenced the US occupation of Haiti as exemplifying the role of development in counterinsurgency warfare. Instructors would reference Haiti’s and other colonial and Cold War histories both in the context of extracting ‘tactics, technologies, and procedures’ they argued could be redeployed in today’s wars, and as justification in response to trainees who rejected the military’s increasing emphasis on development as a weapon of war. Histories served as living proof that development was and always had been an important military weapon. 110 H. Clinton, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Nomination Hearing to be Secretary of State), Washington, DC, January 13, 2009.
militarized development, it also provides a vital perspective to the present era of US militarism, which has again turned to development as a counterinsurgency weapon.

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