

# "Vindictive Earnestness" in Practice: The Campaigns of Ranald S. Mackenzie as a Model of Post-Civil War Indian Policy

Kimberly S. McCall

## Introduction

**I**N *The American Way of War*, Russell Weigley advances the theory that the Civil War gave rise to a new military policy, one which Weigley calls "annihilation," pursued with "frightening literalness . . . much in harmony with post-Civil War national policy."

The general officers responsible for orchestrating this policy were the Civil War icons, Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman. These men took their fresh theory to the Western frontier after the war, where it was deliberately applied to defeat the Indians. The objective of this strategy was the destruction of Indian military power; what made it distinctly annihilationist was the Army's decision to aim its forces at villages, *i.e.* families, rather than war parties alone. Weigley's theory carries with it overtones of racial extermination, a path followed regardless of attempts at peace through any other route. At the conclusion of the Civil War, Weigley asserts that the Army was preparing itself for a "literal campaign of annihilation" in the West.<sup>1</sup>

As exemplified by the Mexican War in the 1840s, United States military policy had largely been one of attrition, an inherently defensive strategy, the goals of which were limited in scope and pursued by "maneuver and occupation of territory rather than by ruthless destruction." In this way, an enemy's will to fight could be worn down with a minimal expenditure of either blood or funds. Annihilation was Napoleonic in origin, and its aim was the literal destruction of any enemy army. Limited such a strategy was not, for it called on a nation's entire supply of material resources in addition to its united manpower; the ability of one side to out-produce its opponent provided the key to victory. The Civil War, as an arena of volatile national tensions coupled with enormous levees of men and a surge in Northern productive capability, fostered an unrestrained strategy of annihilation.<sup>2</sup>

The principal aim of annihilationist doctrine was the destruction of the enemy's military capacity, and there were two facets to this goal. The first, embodied in the

campaigns of General Grant, involved the destruction of the enemy army through continual battle. Weigley refers to Grant as the prophet of annihilation "in a new dimension"; his 1864-1865 operations against Robert E. Lee were essentially one unending altercation that resulted in a "peace of exhaustion." Because such tenacity necessarily entailed tremendous casualties, the general aim of destroying enemy military might became a more immediate one of life-taking.<sup>3</sup>

The other objective of annihilation was the destruction of economic resources, coupled with what Weigley calls a "strategy of terror." General Sherman practiced this type of psychological warfare, with Grant's approval, against the noncombatant population of the South, subjecting them to fear and deprivation so that they might lose their taste for war and force their armies to capitulate. "Fear is the beginning of wisdom," espoused Sherman; complete and utter conquest was the end product of that fear.<sup>4</sup>

The policy of the United States toward Indians prior to the Civil War comprised removal of the tribes to areas deemed unsuitable for white settlement, with the Army posted on the fringes to keep Indians in and whites out. Following the Mexican War, however, an influx of white emigrants through Indian country generated demand for new land, whittled out of existing Indian territory. The Army's main job after the Civil War would be to protect these emigrant roads. Confinement of tribes to strictly defined reservations also initiated a new military policy: Indians who did not stay on their reserved lands or who slipped away to raid were hunted down and punished. Assumption of an offensive stance for the first time, argues Weigley, meant that the Army could "choose its targets." Under General Sherman's authority, Indian nonadherence to white law now meant that these targets would be villages, not fast-moving raiding parties. His orders to kill hostiles who refused to submit made no real distinction between warriors and noncombatants. Hostiles should have no sympathy.<sup>5</sup>

Robert Wooster maintains in *The Military and United*



*States Indian Policy* that historians such as Weigley have overemphasized the strategic connection between the Civil War and the Indian conflict. Claiming this link to be greatly exaggerated, Wooster argues that the Army's frontier success cannot be attributed to a national doctrine of any kind for the simple reason that overall governmental policy toward Indians was haphazard and inconclusive. The Army, responsible for enacting such indeterminate government policy, thus had little guidance.<sup>6</sup>

In Wooster's opinion, the Civil War's chief contribution to military practice on the frontier was to reinforce the value of offensive operations, the nature of which was never precisely defined. Broad guidelines were set down by the commanding general and the division commanders, but specifics were left to departmental and field commanders, who relied on personal inclination to compensate for nebulous orders. Wooster argues that "total war" policy, *i.e.* war on noncombatants and property, was not a new addition to Indian-fighting tactics brought west by Civil War trendsetters. Only after other stratagems failed did frontier leaders resolve to send their troops after villages.<sup>7</sup>

Wooster's critique is based on his belief that the pivotal discrepancy between the Civil and Indian wars lies in the contrasting tactical methods employed, *e.g.* the winter campaigns and converging columns found to be so effective against the Indians. Because of this disparity and because of the lack of clarity in the doctrine of the frontier Army, Wooster discounts similarities between the two conflicts other than the superficial, suggesting that policy as it did exist was an on-the-spot product devised by individual officers. The only frontier policy

credited as consistent by Wooster is the original goal of removal and acculturation, centerpieces of the Reservation system.<sup>8</sup>

Truth exists in the assertions of both historians concerning Army Indian policy. In this essay, the campaigns of Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie and the U.S. 4th Cavalry will be used as a test case against which these arguments concerning the actions of the post-bellum frontier Army may be measured. The choice of Mackenzie as representative of military action arises from his successes on both the Northern and Southern Plains. The paramount reason for selecting Mackenzie, however, is that he was a tirelessly hard-hitting combat officer whom Sherman and later General Philip H. Sheridan considered their best. To study what Mackenzie effected and why it was so applauded reveals basis and intent of Indian policy as subscribed to by two of the Army's pre-eminent generals, as well as the manner of its implementation.

### The Campaigns

#### 1872: Battle of McClellan's Creek

The military policy of the U.S. Army toward hostile Indians had been a punitive one since the 1850s inception of the Reservation system, and it became even more so after the Civil War when white migration across the Great Plains dramatically increased. Lieutenant General Sherman continually reaffirmed his opinion that the Army must never neglect to punish hostiles: "Our only course is for us to destroy the hostile and to segregate the peaceful and maintain them," he advised General Grant in 1867. Sherman's successor in command of the Military Division of the Missouri, General Sheridan,


was likewise committed to the rule that "punishment should always follow crime." These two believed that the only effective tactic to bring Indian warriors to bay was to assault their villages. "The only mode of restraining warriors is by making them feel that we can reach their families and property," said Sherman, and Sheridan agreed.<sup>9</sup>

Responsibility for post-Civil War Indian management rested with the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and President Grant's 1869 Peace Policy sealed this control. Kindness and understanding toward Indians from Christian (and civilian) non-military staff on reservations constituted the core tenet of this policy (also known as the Quaker Policy), in conjunction with a limitation of military authority to hostiles outside the reserve boundaries. Therein lay its fatal flaw. Banishment of the Army from reservations meant that Indians




The 1867 Medicine Lodge Treaty ostensibly provided for peace between whites and the five most powerful Southern Plains tribes. In reality, it did little to ameliorate attitudes and behaviors of either Indians or whites. Only after their virtual destruction at Mackenzie's hands in 1874 did the Comanches and Kiowas resign themselves to reservation life. (*Frank Leslie's Popular Monthly*)





Theater of War in the North: 1866-1877. Conflict with the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne proved to be a much different undertaking from what the Army encountered on the Southern Plains. Until Custer's downfall in 1876 forced a change in Sheridan's policies, the northern tribes could claim a precedent victory stemming from the abandonment of the Bozeman Trail forts in 1868. Again, Ranald Mackenzie found himself to be an important part of yet another concerted military effort aimed at rebellious hostiles. His destruction of Dull Knife's village along the Powder River mirrored the psychological fall-out of Palo Duro, but surpassed it in combat intensity. This battle also crystallized Mackenzie's personal tactical vision and brought surrender of the Northern Cheyenne as did Palo Duro to their southern counterparts. (Map courtesy of Old Army Press)





Heart of War in the South: 1872-1875. Beginning with Randal Mackenzie's "trial by fire" at McClellan's Creek, conflict ferocity in Texas escalated rapidly, running as far afield as Mexico before culminating in the Red River War. Nowhere was Mackenzie's tenacity — and the Army's increasing reliance on his tactical dogmas — more apparent than in the series of simultaneous cavalry/infantry maneuvers whose finale would be the Battle of Palo Duro Canyon. (From *Plains Indian Raiders: The Final Phases of Warfare from the Arkansas to the Red River*, by Wilbur Sturtevant Nye. Copyright © 1968 by the University of Oklahoma Press, Norman)

could sneak away to raid settlements knowing that once they regained their governmental sanctuary, they would be immune to military retribution. This state of affairs was attested in May 1871, when General Sherman, in Texas on an inspection tour, interviewed the lone survivor of an attack perpetrated by Indians from the Fort Sill Reservation. He sent Colonel Mackenzie immediately in pursuit. Though Mackenzie was legally barred from following the raiders onto the reserve, he was able to confirm that hostiles were using the Fort Sill Reserve as a refuge, strengthening the Army's resolve to subjugate the Southern Plains hostiles thoroughly.<sup>10</sup>

The Battle of McClellan's Creek was a manifestation of how the Army desired to wield its punitive sword.

Settlers on the northern Texas frontier had long been victims of Comanche and Kiowa raiders who terrorized them and stole their stock. Sherman ordered General Christopher C. Augur, newly commanding the Department of Texas as of January 1872, to punish them. Augur, in his first statement as incoming commander, announced:

Every commanding officer will be held responsible for Indians; . . . Not content with a mere formal pursuit of a few days . . . they will establish such camps and stations . . . and direct such scouts as, in their opinion, will most surely aid in accomplishing the desired objects of breaking up cattle-



stealing and halting hostile incursions along the northern frontier.

Further orders were issued on 31 May instructing Mackenzie to establish a supply camp and begin scouting to "afford the most chances for punishing hostiles."<sup>11</sup>

Mackenzie himself was adamant that a column needed to move against these Indians since they were beyond any other type of control. Sheridan enthusiastically endorsed this idea; they were deserving of the severest kind of punishment. If Washington would give him a free hand, Sheridan wrote, "I will settle their hash for them."<sup>12</sup>

Mackenzie received command of six companies of the 4th Cavalry (his own regiment), two companies of the 11th Infantry, and three companies of the 24th Infantry. In compliance with Augur's wishes, Mackenzie established a supply camp on the Fresh Fork of the Brazos River as a base from which to scour the Staked Plains, a refuge for many non-reservation raiders. He was rewarded on 29 September 1872, successfully surprising a Comanche village. His report listed 262 lodges destroyed, along with their food and equipment; 23 male Indians killed; about 124 women and children captured; and approximately 2,000 ponies taken.<sup>13</sup>

The value of this confrontation was mainly psychological. Mackenzie's campaign had eliminated the Staked Plains as a bastion for hostile bands. The Indians now realized that not only could the soldiers locate their villages, but that they would not allow the presence of noncombatants to deter them from their mission to force the Indians to Fort Sill, the designated agency for the Comanche and Kiowa tribes.

The McClellan Creek Campaign also brought about the transfer of the 4th Cavalry to the Rio Grande frontier, where President Grant hoped Mackenzie could duplicate his success. Sherman wrote Augur in February 1873 that Mackenzie's job would be to "prevent raids upon people and property. . . . [The] President wishes the 4th moved to that frontier . . . because Mackenzie is enterprising, and will impart to his regiment his own active character."<sup>14</sup>

Mackenzie had embarked upon a decade-long cycle of military troubleshooting, during which he would increasingly follow his own tactical course. What Sherman and Sheridan wanted was an end to hostile Indian incursions. The engineering of this required an independent subordinate, as evidenced by General Augur's orders giving Mackenzie a virtually free tactical rein, with the distinct implication that something was to be *done*. Mackenzie himself was of the opinion that hostiles needed to be dealt severe retribution, and Grant's order dispatching the 4th to take up matters along the Rio Grande confirms the approval with which Mackenzie's tactical decisions were met. The presidential order also reveals White House scrutiny and direction of frontier Army activity. In 1873, Sheridan would present

Mackenzie with an opportunity to push his field activity to an extreme. The result produced a telling statement concerning the implementation of Indian policy.

#### 1873: Battle of Remolino

The Kickapoo Indians who had migrated to Mexico during the Civil War had become adept stock thieves, responsible for much destruction of white lives and property across the Rio Grande River in Texas. Public outcry against this situation finally forced President Grant to announce in January 1873 a redistribution of border forces; he ordered the 4th south to the Rio Grande. After Mackenzie reported the theft of yet more horses in a letter to departmental headquarters, Sheridan recommended to Secretary of War William W. Belknap that the Army should "cross the Rio Grande and recover our property, and punish the thieves"; murderers, he said, should be "exterminated." On 11 April, Mackenzie received two visitors at his headquarters at Fort Clark, Texas — Sheridan and Belknap — and remained closeted with them for two days. He emerged with a clandestine and decidedly explicit order from Sheridan:

I want you to control and hold down the situation, and do it in your own way. I want you to be bold, enterprising, and at all times full of energy. . . . Let it be a campaign, of *annihilation, obliteration, and complete destruction*. . . . I think you understand what I want done, in the way you should employ your force. . . . You are to go ahead in your own plan of action, and your authority and backing shall be General Grant and myself. With us behind you in whatever you do to clean up this situation, you can rest assured of the fullest support [*Italics are mine* — KSM].<sup>15</sup>

Mackenzie's Seminole-Negro scouts located a Kickapoo village near Remolino, Mexico, 40 miles west of the Rio Grande, and they brought word on 16 May that the warriors were temporarily absent. The following noon, six companies of the 4th, about 450 men, left Fort Clark and, following an all-night march, fell at dawn on 18 May on not one but three villages. These were totally destroyed, along with all food and equipment; 19 Indians were killed and two wounded; 42 women and children were captured; and over 50 ponies were taken. When the column recrossed the river at daybreak on 19 May, its total mileage in 32 marching hours stood at 160 miles.<sup>16</sup>

General Sheridan was elated. "Tell Mackenzie he has done a good thing," he wrote Augur on 27 May. Sheridan was quick to remind Belknap of his joint responsibility to back Mackenzie and of the expedition's potential for positive long-term results. "If the government will stand by this action of Colonel Mackenzie's the trouble on the Rio Grande frontier will soon cease," he wrote, adding that boundaries could not be a factor



when settlers were endangered. Belknap dutifully informed the Secretary of the Interior on 24 June that the War Department intended to commend the action.<sup>17</sup>

Mackenzie was already planning a follow-up mission. Less than ten days after the engagement, he wrote enthusiastically to Augur that the Indians were no longer a match for the 4th, for if he could procure fresh horses, he would be "able to hit them another blow." Sheridan, once more endorsing Mackenzie, prophesied that the end of the Rio Grande disturbances was clearly at hand.<sup>18</sup>

The one individual who should have been informed of this scheme beforehand was Sherman, who was displeased. Naturally, he wrote Sheridan, Mackenzie would be sustained

but for the sake of history, I would like to have him report clearly the facts that induced him to know that the Indians he attacked . . . were the identical ones that engaged in raiding Texas. Had he followed a fresh trail there would be law to back him.<sup>19</sup>

Regardless of such disapproval, albeit for legal grounds only, Mackenzie had effected what Sheridan wanted, which was to deter Kickapoo raiding and force the Indians to surrender. Three months after the battle, the Kickapoos began the long walk to Indian Territory. Settlers in southern Texas enjoyed a respite from Mexican-based depredations that was to last for three years.

The 1873 raid, first among several undertaken by the 4th Cavalry, is the most difficult to evaluate. It certainly reverses Wooster's assertion that all field orders were vague, though the fact that special orders were given bolsters his theory of ill-defined military policy. Though historian Paul Hutton refers to this action as a mere "kidnapping raid," Remolino stands as an example of purposeful war against women and children, for Mackenzie did not choose to move until the warriors had departed. This engagement appears to be one of pure extermination, particularly as 19 noncombatants were killed.<sup>20</sup>

Looking more closely, the situation is not so uncomplicated. Mackenzie's meeting with Sheridan and Belknap was a secret one to which the Commanding General was not privy, presumably because the potential for international friction would have led him to veto the move. Mackenzie did not receive merely an order to bring the Kickapoos to a reservation; he was given instead graphic tactical instructions. The implication is that the *usual* methods did not satisfy Sheridan. The concealed nature of the incident could also have had a darker purpose. By sending out a column with unwritten, *i.e.* unofficial, orders into an inescapably sensational action, Sheridan may have been attempting to put the onus of "extermination" onto his field officer or, at least, off of himself. Pro-peace civilian opinion in the East, especially in Congress, made any excessive military

aggression professionally hazardous. As commander of the Division of the Missouri, Sheridan was quite possibly reluctant to foster any bad publicity.<sup>21</sup>

There is something more at work here. Mackenzie did exactly what he was told; he received direct orders and sanction. This is the sole situation in which such an extreme degree of ferocity is stipulated. Mackenzie would afterwards revert to the less exterminationist tactic of destroying villages, capturing women and children, and killing only those who resisted arrest. Though Sheridan had put an approving stamp on indiscriminate killing, Mackenzie did not repeat Remolino, but generally behaved as his own field boss. Mackenzie's campaigns would prove themselves to be both reflections of Sherman's and Sheridan's military intentions — tacit as well as defined — and examples of *de facto* policy implementation. During the Red River War, this latter distinction would be made strikingly manifest.

#### *1874-1875: Red River War*

Since resigning themselves to reservation life in 1869, the Comanches, Kiowas, and Cheyennes of the Southern Plains had endured steadily increasing frustrations. Government annuities of food and supplies were either woefully inadequate or lacking altogether, and white thieves preyed heavily on the Indians's horse herds. Even more infuriating were the buffalo hunters who devastated those once plentiful herds. The hunters made fine targets for young men hungry for war honors and for those who were deathly resentful of whites. Raids and depredations increased to an appalling level in Texas and Kansas. Finally, on 27 June 1874, a large force of warriors under the influence of Comanche prophet Isatai attacked the buffalo hunters' trading post at Adobe Walls, Texas. The Army's response to this assault marked the official start of the Red River War.<sup>22</sup>

Sherman launched the proceedings in mid-July. He wrote Sheridan on the 15th,

Don't you think it would be well to order the 6th and 10th Cavalry to converge on Fort Sill and settle this matter at once, and prevent the Indians from turning towards Texas. . . . Unless something is done now, the rascals will merely rest awhile and start afresh.

The two generals presented to President Grant a plan to settle things; to wit, that all Indians who wished to avoid war should be enrolled at the Fort Sill Agency by 4 August 1874. Those not registered by that date would be considered hostile, and would be forced in, disarmed and dismounted, and their leaders imprisoned. The key to this action's success hinged upon receipt of permission from the Interior Department to enter the reserve with full authority to arrest. On 16 July, Interior Secretary Columbus Delano received an urgent appeal from Sherman for immediate authorization to follow raiders





The virtually sheer walls of Palo Duro Canyon near present-day Canyon, Texas. One nervous trooper, concerned that the 4th Cavalry might not renegotiate them to safety, was bluntly told by Mackenzie: "I brought you in and I will take you out." Though only four Indians were found dead, the previously held notion of the Canyon as a bastion of refuge against white invasion was shattered by the battle, which marked an important psychological turning point in the hostiles' mentality, leading to their surrender the following year at Fort Sill. (Author's Collection)

onto reserves for punishment. The request was honored on 20 July with a message from Secretary Belknap that Indians could be followed anywhere with no obstacles; reservation boundaries were, until further notice, revoked. To Sheridan came an admonition from Sherman to "make every Kiowa and Comanche knuckle down."<sup>23</sup>

Sheridan had published an order on 10 July commencing operations to punish those raiders who could be found off the reserve. For the purpose of this campaign, he advised troops in the departments of the Missouri and Texas to ignore departmental boundaries, wanting nothing to prevent results if, and when, the Army should receive its coveted reservation authority. His plan called for five converging columns, the first two under Colonel Nelson A. Miles and Major William Price from the Department of the Missouri. Command over the last three devolved on Mackenzie, whom Sheridan had had General Augur order up from the border. Besides command of the 4th, Mackenzie would also oversee the movements of columns led by Colonel George Buell and Lieutenant Colonel John "Black Jack" Davidson. Augur's orders of 28 August were brief:

... [Punish Indians] ... for recent depredations along the Kansas and Texas frontiers. ... You are expected to take such measures against them as will, in your judgment, the soonest accomplish the purpose. ... Your own familiarity with Indian warfare renders it unnecessary to give you any instructions in detail. ... Carry out campaign as you see fit.

Mackenzie's own instructions to Buell and Davidson were even thinner: "Endeavor to strike Indian camps," he told them.<sup>24</sup>

Sheridan had intended that the five columns operate in a pincer movement, forcing the Indians to rebound from one to another until they were cornered or simply quit. The expedition would operate along the eastern fringe of the *llano estacado* — the Staked Plains — with Miles and Price north and northwest of Mackenzie.

Buell's and Davidson's columns accomplished little in terms of actual fighting. Buell struck a small camp on 9 October, destroying it and killing one Indian. He pursued the remainder, destroying three abandoned villages totaling almost 500 lodges. Davidson, on 17 November, discovered a deserted camp of 75 lodges, which he burned, pursuing the villagers so closely that they were forced to leave behind 50 heavily laden ponies.<sup>25</sup>

It was the main column that ultimately wrought the most havoc. On 27 September 1874, the 4th Cavalry located five camps of Comanches, Kiowas, and Southern Cheyennes on the floor of Palo Duro Canyon. These villages were surprised and destroyed. Only four Indians were found dead, but all supplies were burned and over 1,000 ponies were shot, so that any Indians returning to the ruins would find nothing at all. Mackenzie believed that the quickest way to humble the hostiles and convince them to surrender would be to take away their horses. It was, he remarked afterwards, "the surest way of crippling them."<sup>26</sup>

Palo Duro was the blow that broke the resistance of the Staked Plains tribes. The people who straggled into Fort Sill during the next months were utterly destitute, their military capabilities ruined. After the final surrender to Mackenzie in June 1875, the Staked Plains Indians gave the United States no more trouble.

Sheridan was jubilant over the results. Writing to Adjutant General Townshend on 29 October, he explained the devastating simplicity of the campaign. The Indians



had no chance to hunt or graze their animals, but were relentlessly tracked until killed or forced into unconditional surrender. Sheridan called it the most successful and comprehensive Indian campaign in American frontier history.<sup>27</sup>

Mackenzie refused to bask in the praise. "It is important that this business be got through with satisfactorily before we let go of it," he cautioned Augur, unconvinced of Indian intentions to behave. He felt that not enough of them had been killed to persuade the rest that they were fighting for a hopeless cause.<sup>28</sup>

Likewise, General Sherman, implacable as ever toward hostiles, grumped that not enough warriors had been killed, though this small criticism did not stop him from commenting to Sheridan in November that if Mackenzie could be given total control, there would be no more Indian worries.<sup>29</sup>

An apparent breakdown occurred in the command chain during this campaign. Examination of correspondence sent by Mackenzie to Augur suggests a good deal of confusion at the operational level. In November, Mackenzie bombarded headquarters with requests for instructions: "Please have instructions sent me or write what are the wishes of the general [Sheridan]. . . . I need a clear understanding of your wishes." Mackenzie appears to be begging for some sort of guidance.<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile, Sheridan wrote Augur on 21 November that he preferred to leave the "final settlement of those Indians who are out to Col. Mackenzie" and withdraw Miles from the field. Sheridan also suggested giving Mackenzie full responsibility for the rest of the campaign, in addition to the military governorship of the Fort Sill Reserve. But no directives were issued. Sheridan was apparently unaware that Mackenzie was asking for orders, and spoke of entrusting him to accomplish an objective that no one seemed able to specifically articulate, especially Mackenzie. This situation seems to bear out Wooster's assertion that no clear policy or directives existed and that military expeditions were haphazard jaunts. Sherman and Sheridan were probably content to delegate to conscientious officers as much responsibility as they would accept. Mackenzie was reluctant to leave the field and assume command of Fort Sill, for he felt the chase had to continue as long as any Indians were absent from the reservation. Nevertheless, to Sill he went, assuming command on 27 March 1875.<sup>31</sup>

The Red River War was a punitive move. The goal was to compel Indians to surrender to Fort Sill authorities, and once this began to happen in November, Sheridan ordered the columns to check their aggressiveness. Mackenzie made his own rules during the affair, largely to compensate for a lack of direction after Palo Duro. His movements were susceptible to change from above, of course, but such changes were usually nonspecific in nature. Due to such laxity, Mackenzie's actions made of him a *de facto* author of Indian policy under a blanket national policy of punishment. In Mackenzie's cam-

paign, camps were destroyed in order to force the Indians to Sill, but the extremes of Remolino did not recur. His tactical intentions are revealed in his statement that hostiles must be killed to make them realize the hopelessness of their position. Sherman and Sheridan gave such a course endorsement by commending Mackenzie and sending him to other trouble spots. Their readiness to allow Mackenzie to work out particulars for himself suggests that their own control over implementation was not always consistent, or felt to be warranted. Sherman's complaint about the lack of warriors killed at Palo Duro or Sheridan's explicit orders before Remolino established their desire for harshness. Acceptance of Mackenzie's tactical decisions, varied in their extremes, illustrates perhaps that the particulars themselves were of relatively small importance so long as problems were eliminated.

### *1876: Powder River Campaign*


In 1866, Sioux leader Red Cloud declared war on the new forts that had been erected to guard Wyoming's Bozeman Trail. His two-year siege of forts Phil Kearny and C. F. Smith led a Peace Commission to treat with the Sioux in 1868 at Fort Laramie. The treaty concessions to the Sioux consisted of the abandonment of the two forts and the establishment of the Great Sioux Reservation. The latter incorporated most of present-day South Dakota west of the Missouri River, with hunting rights north of the Platte and south to the Republican River. On this "unceded" Indian territory no whites would be allowed.<sup>32</sup>

Deep in the heart of the Reserve lay the sacred Black Hills. The Army was officially charged with keeping this area free of white intrusion, but rumors of mineral wealth had whites clamoring for admission by the early 1870s. General Sheridan had long advocated establishing military posts there for the purpose of "threatening the villages and stock of the Indians if they made raids on our settlements." Securing approval from the secretaries of War and Interior, Sheridan, in 1874, sent Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer's 7th Cavalry into the Hills to select fort sites and verify reports of gold.<sup>33</sup> Once Custer did so, however, thousands of miners poured into the region, simultaneously shouting for protection against the justifiably outraged Sioux. President Grant succumbed to this pressure by attempting to purchase the Black Hills from the Indians. But Red Cloud and Spotted Tail, the Sioux leaders who had originally agreed to the Laramie stipulations, refused. The Great Father accordingly chose another alternative, military coercion.

The actions of the Sioux gave Washington a basis for its ensuing activities. For seven years, these Indians had raided around the periphery of their unceded land, terrorizing other tribes, disrupting railroad work and reservation management. As well, adherence to the reserve system among the tribes fluctuated with the seasons and



Nestled just east of the Bighorn Mountains in the valley of Little Piney Creek, Fort Phil Kearny spent its entire existence from 1866-1868 under siege by Red Cloud's Sioux. Daily skirmishes and more serious confrontations such as the Wagon Box Fight and the Fetterman Massacre helped convince prospectors that an easier route could be found to Montana's gold fields. These clashes also fueled a passionate resolve for revenge amongst the Army's high command. When the fort was finally relin-



quished, the Indians burned it to the ground. In this photo, Kearny's remains are visible in the left mid-ground as a flat trapezoidal area: the parade ground. Running out of the picture at the right are the Sullivant Hills (mid-ground) and infamous Lodge Trail Ridge (right foreground), over which Fetterman marched to his doom with 80 men and one dog on 21 December 1866. (Author's Collection)

the competing influence of rival chiefs. The hard-core element that had never accepted sedentary life was ably led by a political and religious leader named Sitting Bull. This white-hating Hunkpapa chief and his military lieutenant, the incomparable Crazy Horse, proved to be a growing source of attraction for discontents. For this reason, the Army sought to force these bands onto the reserve and keep them there. General Sherman declared in 1873 that the Sioux had forfeited their treaty rights by these actions, an opinion echoed by Indian Commissioner Edward P. Smith.<sup>34</sup>

On 3 November 1875, a meeting took place in Washington between President Grant, secretaries Belknap (War) and Zachariah Chandler (Interior), Commissioner Smith, and generals Sheridan and George Crook, commanding the Department of the Platte. The group decided to justify military action against the Sioux by secretly provoking them, endeavoring to do so by withdrawing all troops from the Black Hills so that whites could fill them. Once inevitable confrontations occurred between miner and Indian, the Army could commence a campaign to force the roaming Sioux out of the area and pick up the coveted Hills for the government. By the winter of 1875-1876, an estimated 15,000 miners had invaded the Hills as the Army withdrew.<sup>35</sup>

The Interior Department came up with some documentation to justify their request for military action in a report by Indian Inspector E. C. Watkins, who concluded that "the true policy against bands in the unceded lands would be to send troops against them in the winter . . . and whip them into subjection." Thus armed, Secretary Chandler wrote to Belknap on 3 December 1875:

I have this day directed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to notify [the Sioux] that they must

remove to a reservation by the 31st of January next; . . . if they . . . refuse . . . they will be reported to the War Department as hostile . . . and . . . a military force will be sent to compel them to obey the orders of the Indian Office. You will be notified of the compliance or non-compliance of the Indians with this order; . . . if [they refuse], I have the honor to request that the proper military officer be directed to compel their removal. . . .

As 31 January came and went, Belknap was notified on 1 February that Chandler had handed the Indians over to the War Department "for such action as you deem proper." Belknap replied two days later that Sherman had been formally directed to begin military proceedings.<sup>36</sup>

Sheridan, bent on a winter campaign, dispatched during that same month columns under Crook and General Alfred Terry, but the severity of the weather forced a postponement until spring, when Custer and Colonel John Gibbon joined in the pursuit. At the Battle of the Rosebud on 17 June, General Crook's command was attacked by Sioux and Northern Cheyennes in the largest engagement of the Indian Wars and forced to retreat, a move that effectively removed Crook from the summer campaign. On 25 June, Custer and half of his 7th Cavalry strike force were annihilated alongside the Little Bighorn River by this same contingent of warriors. The Army had underestimated Indian resolve and strength with tragic results. Ironically, however, this quasi-massacre gave to the military the absolute authority it needed to end Northern Plains hostilities: In the summer of 1876, the Secretary of the Interior relinquished control of the Sioux, including those on the Reserve, to General Sheridan.<sup>37</sup>

So began Operation Friendly. Conceived by Sheridan,



Mackenzie's northern version of Palo Duro occurred on 25 November 1876 near present-day Kaycee, Wyoming, along the Red Fork of the Powder River, this time against Dull Knife's Northern Cheyenne. This photo shows the main portion of the battlefield. Charging from the right past the large Red Butte, troopers were halted by Cheyennes hidden in the gully visible at center. The sharp-topped butte just beyond at the base of Fraker Mountain served as Mackenzie's command post. The gully visible at the far left became an escape route out of the village located along the treeline beside the river. Loss of life, provisions, and spirit in this battle for the Cheyenne was insurmountable. (Author's Collection)



the plan aimed to disarm and dismount “friendly” agency Indians so that they could not aid hostiles. The latter were to be ruthlessly tracked down: “reduce these Indians to subjection,” wrote Sheridan to Crook.<sup>38</sup>

Mackenzie had been designated commander of the District of the Black Hills and Camp Robinson, Nebraska, on 17 August. He would be operating in the field directly under Crook, who ordered him to escort the bands of Red Cloud and Red Leaf back to their agency at Robinson. The Indians had moved a few miles away in defiance of the Army, and Sheridan realized correctly that if he let the surrendered Indians defy him, he would

have no chance whatsoever of subduing the hostile ones. On 23 October, Red Cloud's village was surrounded before dawn. At daybreak, Mackenzie had scout Todd Randall announce to the sleeping Sioux that they were surrounded and must surrender. Mackenzie instructed them to pack their essentials and return to the agency, which they did. There was no resistance.<sup>39</sup>

With Mackenzie operating under Crook, and Miles under Terry, the Army went after the Sioux and their Northern Cheyenne allies. On 14 November 1876, almost 2,200 men rode out of Fort Fetterman in search of Crazy Horse's village, thought to be near the Rosebud River. When a scout brought word that another village had been located instead, Crook ordered Mackenzie to attack it.<sup>40</sup>

At dawn on 25 November 1876, east of the Bighorn Mountains on the Red Fork of the Powder River, Mackenzie's 1,100 troopers descended on the Northern Cheyenne village of Dull Knife and Little Wolf, containing almost 200 lodges with an estimated 450 warriors. Mackenzie ordered that the Cheyennes be allowed to fire first. He also sent out interpreters to ask for Dull Knife's surrender, but the old man refused; Mackenzie then ordered the village burned.<sup>41</sup>

Cheyenne losses, in terms of both life and property, were enormous. Out of an estimated 1,500 Indians, about 30 were killed, with an unknown number wounded; meat, blankets, clothing, and



By withdrawing its military overseers from the Siouxian-held Black Hills — and thereby guaranteeing white invasion — the government hoped that clashes such as the one pictured here would bolster public support for the territory's acquisition, despite a dubious method of attainment. (Frank Leslie's *Popular Monthly*)



ammunition was destroyed, and 700 ponies captured. Though fierce Cheyenne resistance continued for the entire day, Mackenzie did not choose to pursue the fugitives at nightfall. "We have captured all their winter supplies," he commented, "and they will have to come to some reservation and surrender."<sup>42</sup>

The destitution of the Northern Cheyennes had immediate as well as far-reaching consequences. The refugees sought out Crazy Horse, who gave them succor. Upon learning of their whereabouts, Mackenzie sent a runner asking them to come in and surrender. This they did at Fort Robinson on 21 April 1877, where Dull Knife remarked to Mackenzie: "You are the one I was afraid of when you came here last summer." The condition of the Cheyenne had great effect on the Sioux, for they could easily see themselves in the same plight should an Army column overtake them. This rise in pro-peace sentiment finally brought Crazy Horse to surrender almost 1,000 Oglala Sioux to Mackenzie in May 1877.<sup>43</sup>

Mackenzie's comment regarding winter supplies during the Dull Knife battle is significant because it provides a clear definition of what he was trying to effect: His attack was made against the Indians's ability to sustain themselves. Sergeant James S. McClellan corroborates this notion. Concerning the escapees, McClellan insists that Mackenzie could have inflicted much greater harm, but chose not to in order to prove to the Cheyennes that his was not a war of extermination. Moreover, when Mackenzie discovered where the survivors had taken refuge, he did not attack them again, instead sending runners to ask for their capitulation. Such behavior suggests that Wooster is correct in his belief that there never did exist a well-defined, firmly adhered-to military policy.<sup>44</sup>

Explicit orders were, as usual, in noticeably short supply. Though Sheridan had kept his columns out in the hope that one would "catch and destroy" the hostiles, his orders merely requested Crook to force them into subjection. Annihilation and subjection are mutually exclusive terms. Mackenzie did not provide headquarters with the former, though all accounts uphold the idea that he could easily have done so. What is interesting here is that the Army had been given a golden opportunity for annihilation. These hostiles had, after all, just decimated the illustrious 7th Cavalry, and, for once, the Interior Department and the public were in agreement with military punishment. If Sherman and Sheridan had had literal annihilation in mind for the Indians, this was their moment. Extremist annihilation, however, did not materialize.

Operation Friendly was a decidedly new twist in the history of reservation relations. For the first time, "friendlies" were as closely monitored as hostiles in an effort to prevent aid to the latter, though operations in the field remained consistent. The grim determination still existed, vindicated at last by a successful conclu-

sion, but the orders proved to be as general as ever. Commanders destroyed villages and pressed the fugitives for surrender, after which they escorted them to an agency; in short, field personnel did as they had always done.<sup>45</sup>

No matter. Sheridan and Sherman were predictably pleased with aggression in whatever form so long as it brought intended results. "The Sioux Indians can never again regain this country," declared Sherman in 1877. Mackenzie's tactics remained unquestioned.<sup>46</sup>

#### *1879-1882: Ute and Apache Conflicts*

In September 1879, the Colorado Utes at White River Agency killed their agent and nine employees, captured others, and ambushed a relief column. On 2 October, Mackenzie was dispatched to Colorado after Sherman ordered Sheridan to send Colonel Wesley Merritt's 9th Cavalry to White River itself, and another column "preferably under Mackenzie" to Fort Garland. In May 1880, Mackenzie took 1,500 troopers to Los Pinos Agency where Sherman ordered him to sit tight and let the Interior Department do all it could to negotiate with the Utes. Mackenzie spent the summer composing letters denouncing mild governmental policy toward renegades. As for the Utes, they agreed to a new reservation after observing Mackenzie's handling of the 4th and its frequent scouting expeditions.<sup>47</sup>

In August 1881, the Utes decided that they would not move after all. Mackenzie, who had assumed command of the Department of the Arkansas (created especially for him by Sheridan), was sent back to Los Pinos. On 25 August, he informed the Ute chieftains:

I have been ordered by the Army to see that you move to the new reservation. . . . It is not necessary for me to stay here any longer. You can settle this matter by discussion among yourselves. All I want to know is whether you will go or not. If you will not go of your own accord, I will make you go. When you . . . have arrived at a conclusion, send for me.

The Utes left in two days with no resistance.<sup>48</sup>

In September 1881, Sherman ordered the 4th to Arizona where Department Commander General Orlando Willcox was having trouble controlling the Apaches. "I want this annual Apache stampede to end right now," Sherman fired over the wires to Division Commander Irwin McDowell, referring to perpetual Apache discontent, "and to effect that result will send every available man in the whole army if necessary." What he did send was the 4th Cavalry, giving Mackenzie command of all field troops in Arizona. McDowell protested, but Sherman was adamant that Mackenzie must remain until the "moral effect intended by sending him there has been fully accomplished." By the end of October, Mackenzie was able to report that the heavy





One more manifestation of post-Little Bighorn fears and frustrations. Note the weaponry: As Wilbur Nye observed, red warriors were issued rifles by the Interior Department with which to shoot white warriors from the War Department. (*Harper's Weekly*)

buildup of troops had frightened the troublemakers into surrendering.<sup>49</sup>

On 30 October 1881, Mackenzie was made commander of the District of New Mexico, effecting the leap from combat to administration. The Apaches were hostile and made pursuit, never easy, especially tough, for they cared little for departmental or international boundaries. Finally, acting as had Sheridan in 1873, Mackenzie dispatched Lieutenant Colonel George A. Forsyth with the 4th Cavalry into Mexico in 1882 with orders for "indefatigable pursuit" of the raiders. Sheridan approved this move with typical zeal. Sherman petitioned War Secretary Robert Lincoln to put New Mexico into the Department of Arizona and promote Mackenzie to brigadier general commanding so that he could "make quick work of the Apache matter." Sherman was overruled, even though the hostiles had returned to their reserve by fall.<sup>50</sup>

The most noticeable difference between these episodes and their predecessors is their virtual bloodlessness. It is compelling to note that such an aggressive soldier as Mackenzie ultimately considered the peaceful settlement of the Ute crisis to be his greatest Indian success. These three years illustrate the fact that Mackenzie

was Sherman's and Sheridan's pet troubleshooter. They never seriously questioned his tactical decisions during this time, even though these circumstances were largely "no contact" events. The two appreciated the fact that Mackenzie's reputation and behavior so clearly promised aggression that the majority of his opponents backed down; that he would also *act* had been proven beyond question. Mackenzie could "secure peace by his very presence," avowed Sherman, who congratulated him and moved him to yet another square on the frontier chessboard. It is evident that while headquarters was as punitively minded as ever, it was not advocating blind annihilation, as approval of Mackenzie's actions demonstrates.<sup>51</sup>

By 1879, Sherman and Sheridan had given Mackenzie free rein. Wooster here appears to be perfectly justified in asserting that field commanders were cut loose from any sort of guiding hand. Yet there *was* guidance, and from the top. The official authors of military policy, removed from its direct orchestration, considered Mackenzie's campaigns to be among the most significant aspects of frontier history. The reason for such esteem can only be that Mackenzie fully gratified the desires of headquarters.<sup>52</sup>

### Conclusion

National Indian policy in the United States was formulated by the Interior Department; very simply, it called for peace within the reservations and war without, with punishment of Indian transgressions to be the military's sole purpose. Prior to the Civil War, the particulars of *how* such war was to be made had no officially consistent characteristics other than humanitarian exhortations to spare the innocent. Punitive expeditions against war parties using conventional Army tactics had been proven ineffective by 1865, and some field officers had begun experimenting with new ideas such as winter campaigns and village assaults. It was partly from knowledge of these experiences and partly from Civil War influences that generals Sherman and Sheridan drew their inspirations to concentrate retaliatory strikes against non-warriors, much as they had done against Confederate civilians.

Weigley's Policy of Annihilation — insofar as he means the total destruction of enemy military capacity — was a practice enthusiastically espoused by Sherman and Sheridan. It is imperative to realize, however, that they directed such actions against hostiles, not the entire Indian population. Sherman wrote that hostiles' fates should be commensurate with their crimes, and that field officers would be "fully justified in their utter extermination." Similarly, Sheridan sent out expeditions with orders to "punish the whole tribe." Though such statements endorse harsh measures, they were directed against military enemies, including the non-warrior element. Weigley's argument implies that this policy was used as a tool for racial extermination ("literal annihila-



tion"); Sherman and Sheridan meant it to encompass any military opponents, be they white rebels or red.<sup>53</sup>

Due to uncertain communications and the vastness of the Plains, neither general was in an easy position to personally supervise field operations. Their orders to departmental commanders were broad and were passed on to field personnel equally so or with only slight embellishments. Beyond the basic admonition to suppress hostiles, commanders such as Mackenzie were issued no tactical absolutes. Wooster is thus correct that tactical specifics were oftentimes, and of necessity, "on-the-spot" creations. But they were most definitely guided in general operations by an expressed headquarters desire to destroy a military threat using punitive measures.

Mackenzie thus made war on Indian military capacity; he chose to do this by effecting the surrender of the hostile faction, though he did not hesitate to kill if resisted. In either case, he eliminated the threat and satisfied his superiors. Neither Sherman nor Sheridan would tolerate continued hostility from the tribes, a view shared by Mackenzie himself. Though Sheridan's orders for Remolino were an explicit deviation from the course Mackenzie normally followed, both Sheridan and Sherman otherwise accepted his tactical decisions. That these methods were approved, even if bloodless, was demonstrated by the Ute and Apache disputes. Because of such approval, because Mackenzie was consistently called on to diffuse tense situations, he became, in effect, a policymaker of virtually the same importance as his superiors in that he was responsible for the manner of its implementation. Mackenzie operated in concert with colleagues to obtain general objectives originating at headquarters. The impossibility for Sherman or Sheridan to supervise operations personally forced them to relinquish certain prerogatives to officers in the field, thereby imbuing combat personnel with the Indian-fighting Army's true source of authority.

#### NOTES

1. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 153, 158, 159.
2. *Ibid.*, 66, 77.
3. *Ibid.*, 145.
4. *Ibid.*, 149, 151.
5. *Ibid.*, 159; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States* (New York: Free Press, 1984), 237; Francis P. Prucha, *American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 83; U.S. Congress, *House Executive Document 1*, 39(1), Serial 1248, vol. 2, 380; *Ibid.*, 39(2), Serial 1285, vol. 3, 17, 20; Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed., *The American Indian and the U.S.: A Documentary History*, 4 vols. (New York: Random House, 1973), 1:179.
6. Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 111, 213.
7. *Ibid.*, 27, 136, 143.
8. *Ibid.*, 7, 211.
9. Weigley, *The American Way*, 155-156; Carl C. Rister, "Documents Relating To General W. T. Sherman's Southern Plains Indian Policy, 1871-1875," *Panhandle-Plains Historical Review*, 9 (1936): 19; Robert G. Athearn, *William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 162, 272; U.S. Congress, *House Executive Document 1*, 40(2), Serial 1324, vol. 2, 34; *ibid.*, 43(1), Serial 1597, pt. 2, 41-42; *Ibid.*, 40(3), Serial 1367, vol. 3, 7.
10. Paul Stuart, *The Indian Office: Growth and Development of an American Institution, 1865-1900* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1979), 19; Richard N. Ellis, "General John Pope and the Southern Plains Indians, 1875-1883," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 72 (Oct. 1968): 153.
11. Ernest Wallace, *Ranald S. Mackenzie on the Texas Frontier* (Lubbock: West Texas Museum Association, 1964), 30, 65; Ernest Wallace, ed., *Ranald S. Mackenzie's Official Correspondence Relating to Texas, 1871-1873* (Lubbock: West Texas Museum Association, 1967), 71.
12. W. S. Nye, *Carbine and Lance: The Story of Old Fort Sill* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 148; Wallace, *Official Correspondence*, 82, 89.
13. Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 81-82. Estimates of the numbers of ponies taken ranged from 800 to 3,000. To Mackenzie's mortification, the Comanches restole most of their horses during the column's return march. To Mackenzie's credit, this was never repeated.
14. Wallace, *Official Correspondence*, 162.
15. Ernest Wallace and Adrian S. Anderson, "R. S. Mackenzie and the Kickapoos: The Raid Into Mexico In 1873," *Arizona and the West*, 7 (Summer 1965): 110; Wallace, *Official Correspondence*, 163, 178; Robert G. Carter, *On the Border with Mackenzie, Or Winning West Texas from the Comanches* (New York: Antiquarian Press, Ltd., 1961), 422; Paul A. Hutton, *Phil Sheridan and His Army* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 222.
16. Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), 347; Wallace, *Official Correspondence*, 165; Carter, *On the Border*, 465.
17. Hutton, *Phil Sheridan*, 223; Wallace, *Official Correspondence*, 171-172, 178.
18. Wallace, *Official Correspondence*, 180, 183.
19. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 349.
20. Hutton, *Phil Sheridan*, 226.
21. Captain Robert G. Carter was the only officer of the 4th to whom Mackenzie confided the details of this order; consequently, his is its only written version; Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 192; Richard N. Ellis, *General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), 151.
22. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 212-213.
23. Joe F. Taylor, "The Indian Campaign on the Staked Plains, 1874-1875: Military Correspondence from War Department, Adjutant General's Office, File 2815-1874," *Panhandle-Plains Historical Review*, 34 (1961): 10-12; W. S. Nye, *Plains Indian Raiders: The Final Phases of Warfare from the Arkansas to the Red River* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), 168; Ellis, *General Pope*, 184; Nye, *Carbine and Lance*, 187-188.
24. William Leckie, *Indian Wars of the Red River Valley* (Sacramento, CA: Sierra Oaks Publishing Co., 1986), 78, 80-81, 83; Wallace, *On The Texas Frontier*, 129.
25. Taylor, "The Indian Campaign," 80, 108.
26. Taylor, "The Indian Campaign," 75; Carter, *On the Border*, 495. There were smaller conquests made by Mackenzie's column. In early November, two small villages were destroyed, with four Indians killed and 19 captured, along with 170 ponies. In Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 155-156.
27. Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 166. The count after four months stood at one battle and 11 skirmishes fought, 11 Indians killed and 22 captured, and more than 1,600 ponies taken; U.S. Congress, *House Executive Document 1*, 44(1), Serial 1674, pt. 2, vol. 2, 58.
28. Ernest Wallace, ed., *Ranald S. Mackenzie's Official Correspondence Relating to Texas, 1873-1879* (Lubbock: West Texas Museum Association, 1968), 165.
29. Hutton, *Phil Sheridan*, 260.
30. Leckie, *Indian Wars*, 165-166, 176.
31. *Ibid.*, 171; Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 159; Jean L. Zimmerman, "Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie at Fort Sill," *Chronicles of Oklahoma*, 44 (Spring 1966): 13.
32. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 135; Charles J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1904), 2:998-1007.



33. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 244; U.S. Congress, *House Executive Document 1*, 43(2), Serial 1635, pt. 2, 24.
34. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 246.
35. *Ibid.*, 247; John S. Gray, *Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of 1876* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 25.
36. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 247; Hutton, *Phil Sheridan*, 300; Gray, *Centennial Campaign*, 31; U.S. Congress, *House Executive Document 1*, 44(2), Serial 1742, vol. 2, pt. 2, 28; U.S. Army, *Record of Engagements With Hostile Indians Within the Military Division of the Missouri from 1868-1882*, Lieutenant General P.H. Sheridan, Commanding (Chicago, IL: Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri, 1882), 57.
37. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 251; U.S. Congress, *ibid.*, 35.
38. *Ibid.*, 28, 38.
39. George Bird Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 361.
40. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 275.
41. Fred H. Werner, *The Dull Knife Battle* (Greeley, CO: Werner Publications, 1981), 31, 33, 38; Thomas W. Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-90* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 83.
42. Lessing H. Nohl, Jr., "Mackenzie Against Dull Knife: Breaking the Northern Cheyennes in 1876," in *Probing the American West: Papers from the Santa Fe Conference*, K. Ross Toole, ed. (Santa Fe, NM: n.p., 1962), 90; Werner, *The Dull Knife Battle*, 38.
43. Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 399; Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 174; Ernest Wallace, "Prompt in the Saddle: The Military Career of Ranald S. Mackenzie," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, 9 (1971): 179. Dull Knife was a Sioux translation of the old chieftain's name. His proper Northern Cheyenne name was translated "morning star." In Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 426; Wallace, *ibid.*, 179.
44. Werner, *The Dull Knife Battle*, 57.
45. U.S. Congress, *ibid.*, 39.
46. Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 281.
47. U.S. Congress, *House Executive Document 1*, 46(2), Serial 1910, vol. 9, 93-94; Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 185-186; Wallace, "Prompt in the Saddle," 181; Robert Emmitt, *The Last War Trail: The Utes and the Settlement of Colorado* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), 185-186.
48. Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 187.
49. U.S. Congress, *House Executive Document 1*, 47(1), Serial 2010, vol. 2 pt. 2, 144; Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 188; Wallace, "Prompt in the Saddle," 183.
50. Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 189; Emmitt, *The Last War Trail*, 188-189.
51. Wallace, "Prompt in the Saddle," 182; Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 175.
52. Wallace, *On the Texas Frontier*, 194.
53. Athearn, *William Tecumseh Sherman*, 301; Hutton, *Phil Sheridan*, 89.
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Kimberly S. McCall received her B.S. in biology in 1983 from Mary Washington College in Fredericksburg, VA (once part of the University of VA). Her professional work has included clinical work at Duke University Medical Center in Durham, NC, in psychobiological and cancer research, and also in AIDS research at the Durham Veterans Administration Medical Center. She earned her M.A. from Duke in 1990, and her specific historical interest is 19th-century military history. She currently resides in Montreal and is working on another M.A. at Concordia University, this one in medical history.



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